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STUDENT NOTES
Criminal Responsibility to Determine Insanity-
The Model Penal Code Test Emerges
from the Currently Existing Tests
It is a matter of general knowledge that insanity is a defense
to a criminal act. "A man's act does not make him guilty unless
his mind also is guilty."' No person can be criminally responsible
for a crime unless he is sane at the time the offense is committed.
In this discussion, the degree of criminal responsibility requisite to
determine sanity, at the time of the alleged offense, is of prime im-
portance. There are also certain safeguards in the law protecting
the insane from trial and punishment, if insanity appears prior to
trial or sentencing; although these phases of criminal irresponsi-
bility are not reached in this note. The development of the Ameri-
can Law Institute's Model Penal Code test of determining criminal
' "Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea." II RADziNowicz & TuuNER,
MENTAL ABNORMALITY AND CRIME iX (1944).
[64]
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responsibility at the time of the alleged offense, as a product of
existing tests, will be outlined in this article.
The law and medicine have become so inextricably tangled
that it is often erroneously supposed that insanity is a medical term.
Although the exact legal meaning of insanity has not been authori-
tatively decided, the law does recognize that insanity is purely a
legal concept.2 A fair explanation of the legal philosophy of in-
sanity is the incapacity to entertain a criminal intent: one method
of avoiding criminal responsibility. The philosophy of criminal
responsibility has not changed nor is it suggested that it should
change, but problems appear when translating the philosophy into
practical rules for everyday courtroom use.3 No exact formula has
been found for a realistic determination of criminal responsibility.
Several tests have been accepted and applied by the courts and
without exception each test has been roundly criticized.
THE M'NAGHTEN* RULE'
The M'Naghten rule is the most well known and widely ac-
cepted test of criminal responsibility. Commonly, the rule is char-
acterized as the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong.5
Generally, a person is not criminally responsible for an offense if
at the time it is committed he is so mentally unsound as to lack
knowledge that the act is wrong.6 The M'Naghten rule is the sole
test in England and a majority of states, including West Virginia.'
In fact, every state in this country, except New Hampshire and Ver-
mont, has adopted the rule, although some states have supplemented
it with the irresistible impulse test, and these are considered states
which employ the irresistible impulse test. As universal as the
M'Naghten rule would appear, almost every word of the opinion
2 WHITE, INSANITY AND THE CRiMINAL LAW 102 (1923); II R1DzInowicz
& TURNER, op. cit. supra note 1, at xiii.
3 Carter v. United States, -252 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
* There are at least four recognized methods of spelling M'Naghten.
This choice was arbitrary.
4 M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
5 CLARX & MARSHALL, LAW OF CImus § 84 (5th ed. 1952).6 WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRmnINAL DEFENSE 51 (1954).7 Accord, State v. Painter, 135 W. Va. 106, 63 S.E.2d 86 (1950); State
v. Evans, 94 W. Va. 47, 117 S.E. 885 (1923); State v. Cook, 69 W. Va. 717,
72 S.E. 1025 (1911); State v. Maier, 36 W. Va. 757, 15 S.E. 991 (1892);
State v. Harrison, 36 W. Va. 729, 15 S.E. 982 (1892). For an analysis of
the views taken by various authorities concerning the M'Naghten rule with
regard to West Virginia see Silverstein, Psychology, Mental Illness, and the
Law, 60 W. VA. L. Rnv. 55, 133 (1958).
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following the I'Naghten case has been criticized as ambiguous.'
Listed among the most objectionable words are "knowledge" and
"wrong." It has been suggested that a harsh application of the
word "knowledge" has required the accused to ". . . move as dis-
creetly and circumspectly as if the undimmed light of reason . . ."
were shining on his path.' The confusion concerning the word
"wrong" is an outgrowth of the dual construction of moral wrong
and legal wrong.
THE IRRESISTIBLE IMPULSE TEST
The irresistible impulse test of determining criminal responsi-
bility has been adopted by at least fourteen states, and in every
instance it encompasses the M'Naghten rule within it.' Basically,
the irresistible impulse test denies criminal responsibility where the
accused lacks the knowledge that the act is wrong (M'Naghten
rule) or will power enough to resist the impulse to commit it. Sim-
ilar to the M'Naghten rule, certain words of the irresistible impulse
test have been labeled ambiguous. It has been suggested that the
word "irresistible" be replaced by "the lack of power of control";"
and "impulse" be defined so as to disallow an "urge,"" and do
away with the requirement of a momentary impulse.' The irresist-
ible impulse test first appeared within a decade of the M'Naghten
rule. In the past century, few states have added the irresistible
impulse test to the M'Naghten rule; so too, few states which fol-
lowed the irresistible impulse test have abandoned it in favor of the
M'Naghten rule as the sole test of criminal responsibility.' 4 West
Virginia rejected the irresistible impulse test in State v. Harrison."
The court reasoned that a person who knew the nature and quality
of the act and that it was wrong could not be driven to commit it
by any uncontrollable impulse.
8 ".... these ambiguities continue to becloud the law." WEiHoFEN, op.
cit. supra note 6, at 76.
9 1 CLEVENGER, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY 21 (1898).
I°WEHoFEN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 51; Irresistible impulse test has
been recognized in Virginia since 1881. Dejarnette v. The Commonwealth,
75 Va. 867 (1881).
" I WEioFEN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 84.
"2The urge does not command the action. The impulse is the action
itself. Snider v. Smyth, 187 F. Supp. 299 (E.D. Va. 1960).
"Accord, Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895); cf. United
States v. Naples, 192 F. Supp. 23 (D.C. D.C. 1961).
'1 "The only development during the past century has been the progres-
sive hardening of the rules into precedents." GuTrMACHER & WEMOFEN,
PSYCmATRY AND THE LAW 424 (1952).
1"36 W. Va. 729, 15 S.E. 982 (1892).
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THE DuRHAM RULE
In Durham v. United States, 6 another test of criminal responsi-
bility emerged. "The Durham rule requires that a finding of not
guilty by reason of insanity ensue if the act was the product of
mental disease or defect in the defendant.""' The Durham case
has not been followed by any state. 8 The ambiguous words of the
Durham rule are "product" and "mental disease." 9
The New Hampshire test of criminal responsibility is often
said to be substantially the same as the Durham rule. Perhaps it
would be more accurate to say that New Hampshire has no test of
criminal responsibility;" it is a question of fact for the jury in each
case.
THE MODEL PENAL CODE TEST
As a result of the general unhappiness and unrest among the
authorities as to what the true test for criminal responsibility should
be, the American Law Institute, in drafting a Model Penal Code,
proposed a new test designed to satisfy the apparent need for a
practicable solution to this issue. In United States v. Currens,"'
the defendant was convicted of interstate transfer of a stolen motor
vehicle, after entering a plea of not guilty because of insanity. The
defense requested instructions which included the M'Naghten rule
and the Durham rule. The court refused to instruct regarding the
Durham rule, but did give the M'Naghten rule plus the irresistible
impulse test instruction.2 Held, reversed, establishing a new test
for determining criminal responsibility. The new test was, in sub-
stance, the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code test.
"The jury must be satisfied that at the time of committing
the prohibited act the defendant, as a result of mental disease
16214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
1 7 Note, 1959 DuKE LJ. 317, 320 (1959).
'The highest courts. of the following states have rejected the Durham
rule: Arizona, Arkansas, California,'Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois,
Indiana, Kansas, 'Maryland, MassachusettS, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
Nevada, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Washington. United States v.
Naples, 192 F. Supp. 23 (D.C. D.C. 1961).1 9 Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
2 oWEHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 52.
21 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961).
2 2 The leading United States Supreme Court decision providing a test
for insanity in federal courts is Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895),
which is a combination of the M'Naghten rule and irresistible impulse test,
without the requirement of resulting from a momentary impulse. United
States v. Naples, 192 F. Supp. 23 (D.C. D.C. 1961).
1961 ]
4
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 1 [1961], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol64/iss1/6
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
or defect, lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct
to the requirements of law which he is alleged to have violated.""
Aside from the procedural questions involved in the Currens
case, it was necessary for the court to rule on three distinct proposi-
tions of law to arrive at its decision:
Was the M'Naghten-irresistible impulse test proper so as to
allow the admission of expert testimony which would give the jury
sufficient, intelligent and understandable facts on which to determine
if the defendant was criminally responsible for his act?
Was the M'Naghten-irresistible impulse test the proper instruc-
tion to the jury, to assist them in determining if the defendant was
capable of entertaining criminal intent?
Was the Durham rule proper to accomplish the desired ad-
missibility of evidence and the correct instructions, if in fact, the
M'Naghten-irresistible impulse test did not accomplish those re-
quirements?
The answer to each interrogatory was no.
In striving to arrive at a practicable standard for measuring the
degree of irresponsibility necessary to excuse a criminal act, the
court, in the instant case, desired to incorporate the best qualities
of the M'Naghten rule and the Durham rule, ". . . while perpetuating
neither the stringency of the former nor the leniency of the latter."2
The key words of the test laid down by the Currens case are "sub-
stantial capacity." By these terms, the psychiatrist is no longer
compelled to testify by a concept which to him was without reality,
in other words, knowledge of right and wrong, irresistible impulse
and disease product. The jury is no longer instructed to apply an
artificial standard for equating a man's mental condition with his
legal responsibility. Generally, a very practical courtroom technique
has evolved.
The fact that there was a great need for a change in the law
in the area of criminal responsibility had been repeatedly mani-
fested. The feeling was that it was time that the law caught up with
the present day psychiatric understanding of mental disorders.25
The tests of insanity available before the Currens case refused to
acknowledge the existence of a gray area. The defendant was either
23 United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 774 (3d Cir. 1961).
24 Note, 1959 DuKE L.J. 317, 323 (1959).
25 GuTrmAcnR & WEiHoFEN, op. cit. supra note 14, at 415.
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guilty or not guilty, sane or insane.2" Under the Model Penal Code
test, ". . . impulses, delusions, knowledge of right and wrong are
no longer conceived as concrete entities that either are or are not."2
Although frequently denied, some authorities have felt that
unconsciously juries have been applying their own individual tests
of determining insanity, consistent with the safety of society but
inconsistent with the rule directed by the court. 8 Following this
line of reasoning, there is no fear that the "moral judgment" of
juries will, under the Model Penal Code test, weaken the deterrent
influence of criminal law. Whether the accused can be justly held
responsible for his act will be the ultimate issue in any event.
In determining if the courts of this country will accept the
new test from the Currens case, it is vital to recognize the broadening
effect of some of the language contained therein. "Capacity to
conform" may very well embrace the essential elements of the ir-
resistible impulse test. 9 West Virginia, for one, has specifically
rejected the irresistible impulse test.3"
Vermont has adopted the Model Penal Code test by statute."1
The Vermont statute substitutes the word "adequate" for the word
"substantial" and adds a sentence which elaborates on "mental
disease or defect."32
Cases are legion in their criticisms of the prevailing tests of
determining the criminal responsibility of the mentally ill. There
has been a crying hunger for the development of a new test, placing
a more realistic legal standard on medical technology. While some
courts are sure to label the Model Penal Code .test a wrong step
in the right direction, others may feast on. this effort of the American
Law Institute. To be sure, before any change can take place, the
court must be persuaded, first,. that the present test is not the best
available; second, that the time is ripe for a change; and third, that
the harvest from such a change will reap more advantages than
disadvantages. . . .. . ..
James William Sarver
2 6 NicE, CRIME AND INSANITY 238 (1958).2 7 WHITE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 104.
2 8 NIcE, op. cit. supra note 26, at 144; but see, LiNDMAN & McINryim,
THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 335 (1961).
2 9 WEIHoFEN, THE URGE TO PUNISH 66 (1956).
31 State v. Harrison, 36 W. Va. 729, 15 S.E. 982 (1892).
3' VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4801 (1959).
32 LINDmAN & McINTYRE, op. cit. supra note 28, at 334.
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